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Federal and United States Jurisdiction Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Ferlinden B. V P. Central Bank of Nigeria
In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,' Congress granted
federal courts original jurisdiction over disputes arising against foreign
sovereigns not entitled to immunity. 2 In Verh'nden B. V v. Central Bank of
Nigeria,3 the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the
Act authorized even alien plaintiffs to sue foreign sovereigns in United
States courts 4 and that the Act's grant of federal jurisdiction in these
alien-foreign sovereign cases was a constitutional exercise of congressional power. 5 The Court thus reversed a controversial Second Circuit
decision 6 which had held that this grant of federal jurisdiction was not
within Congress' article III authority.
The Ver/inden decision reaffirms the Supreme Court's commitment
to a broad interpretation of the "arising under" clause of article III 7 and
supports Congress' desire for uniformity in the interpretation of the law
governing foreign sovereign immunity.8 More importantly, Ver/inden virtually assures exclusive federal jurisdiction in future cases against foreign
sovereigns, 9 while providing checks against unnecessary litigation in
American courts. 10
The Verh'nden case arose when Verlinden, a Dutch corporation, sued
Nigeria's Central Bank in a New York federal district court for anticipa1 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976), cofiedat 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976). For a syllabus of each of these provisions, see Note, Federal
QuestionJunsdicton under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of

Nigeria, 17

WILLIAMETrE

L.J. 275, 277 n.17 (1980). Pertinent provisions will be cited through-

out the text.
2

28 U.S.C. §1330(a) (1976). See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6610 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The House

and Senate Reports were identical.
3 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
4 Id.at 1973.
5 Id
6 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct.
1962 (1983).
7 See Note, Subject MalerJurnsdictonand the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Aci of 1976, 68 VA.

L. REv. 893, 893 (1982) (Second Circuit's interpretation of "arising under" clause is overly
restrictive).
8 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1973 (Congress deliberately sought to channel cases interpreting
sovereign immunity into federal courts to prevent multiplicity of conflicting interests).
9 See infa notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
10 See infta notes 116-42.
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tory breach of an irrevocable letter of credit." Neither side seriously
disputed the fact that Nigeria's actions constituted an anticipatory
breach, nor did they disagree that New York law governed the letter of
credit. 12 Instead, Nigeria's "instrumentality"' 3 argued that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act did not authorize alien-foreign sovereign suits
in United States federal courts, that any such authorization was uncon4
stitutional, and that Central Bank was entitled to sovereign immunity.'
Thus, Nigeria challenged both the district court's federal jurisdiction (on
statutory and constitutional grounds) and its United States jurisdiction
(on sovereign immunity grounds) over the controversy. 15
Ver/inden essentially raised four questions which had not conclusively
been resolved by American courts: (1) whether the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act could constitutionally grant only restrictive immunity to
foreign sovereigns which had originally enjoyed absolute immunity in
America; (2) whether Congress in enacting the Act had authorized federal jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits; (3) whether such an
authorization was constitutional; and (4) whether the standards governing sovereign immunity exempted Nigeria's Central Bank from
" Nigeria had overordered cement from many suppliers, including Verlinden. The Verlinden transaction had been secured by an irrevocable letter of credit which Nigeria's Central
Bank had established through Morgan Guaranty Bank in New York despite a clause in the
contract requiring that it be established in Slavenberg's Bank in the Netherlands. Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),af don othergrounds,
647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). When Nigerian ports became bottlenecked with 260 ships carrying cement, and demurrage charges began to grow, Central Bank
directed Morgan Guaranty to amend this and other letters of credit to pay only those suppliers
who acquired approval from Nigeria. Rather than seeking such approval, which would inevitably entail renegotiation of the contract terms, Verlinden sued for anticipatory breach. 103 S.
Ct. at 1965-66. For a more complete account of the facts giving rise to the suit, see Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 302-06 (2d Cir. 1981)
(Nigeria's unilateral actions "took place on a scale previously unknown in international
commerce").
12 Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1288. Accord, Comment, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria: FederalJurisdictionover Cases Between Ahns and ForeignStates, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1057,
1059 n.13 (1982). In addition to the common law action for anticipatory breach of contract,
Central Bank's actions were in violation of the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits of the International Chamber of Commerce. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 322 n.7; Note,
FederalQuestion jursdiction over Actions Brought by Ahens Against Foreign States, 15 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 463, 464 (1982).
13 Verliden, 103 S. Ct. at 1965-66. An instrumentality or agency relationship exists when a
foreign state (or one of its subdivisions) holds a majority interest in a seperate legal body or
treats that body as its organ. 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) (1976). Central Bank was undisputedly considered an "instrumentality" of Nigeria, thereby entitling it to the same treatment as the foreign
state itself. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15-16 (central banks are specifically to be
included as instrumentalities).
"4 Verlinden,
103 S. Ct. at 1966.
15 Nigeria did not challenge United States jurisdiction on grounds other than sovereign
immunity because alien-foreign sovereign suits had previously been allowed in state courts. See,
e.g. ,J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975) (act of state defense rejected). For a discussion of the policy reasons
for and against United States jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits, see infra notes 11732 and accompanying text.
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American jurisdiction. The courts found each question progressively
more difficult to resolve.
The Ver/inden courts had no trouble ruling that the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity was legitimate, 16 rubber-stamping a doctrine
which had been practiced for over thirty years but only recently codified
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.' 7 The courts found that
America's original grant of absolute immunity had been based in grace
and comity rather than in the constitution.18
The second question was more difficult to resolve, although all three
Verlinden courts eventually ruled that federal jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits was authorized by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.1 9 The courts examined both the legislative intent and the statutory
language in making this determination. The district court and court of
appeals both found the legislative intent somewhat unclear 20 but felt
that the clear statutory language authorized federal jurisdiction: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard .to amount
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . .
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity
"12

16 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1967; Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1291. The court of appeals did
not address the question directly, probably assuming the validity of the restrictive theory to be
settled law.
17 See infira notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
18 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1967. The theory of absolute immunity dates back to Chief
Justice Marshall's decision in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 12 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812). The Supreme Court's Verlinden decision seems clearly correct, given Marshall's recognition in Schooner Exchange of the potential for a restrictive immunity theory: "A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that
property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince,
and assuming the character of a private individual [that jurisdiction is justified]." Schooner Exchange at 145. See Comment, Problems "4rzng Under" Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 1039, 1044-47 (1982).
19 Verhnden, 103 S. Ct. at 1969-70; Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 324; Verhnden, 488 F. Supp.-at
1292-93. Prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, federal jurisdiction over suits between
aliens and foreign sovereigns existed only when the case was in admiralty or arose under another
federal law. See Note, Suits by Foreigners Against Foreign States in United States Courts.. A Selective

Expansion ofjur dzction, 90 YALE L.J. 1861, 1865-66 (1981).
20 Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 323-24; Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1291-92. While the legislative
history clearly emphasized that the Act's primary purpose was to provide remedies for Americans against foreign sovereigns, and was not intended to open up American courts to all international claims, unqualified references to suits by "parties" against foreign states led the courts to
conclude that "Congress formed no clear intent" on the matter. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 324. But
see 1 J. MOORE, J. LUCAs, H. FINK, D. HECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.66[4] at 700.178-79 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]

(Congress plainly intended to confer jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits on federal
courts); contra Note, supra note 12, at 478-81 (Congress clearly did not intend to greatly expand
jurisdiction with so little discussion). For a more detailed examination of the legislative history
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see generally Note, supra note 7, at 898-902. The courts'
examination of legislative intent when the statutory language was clear has been criticized as
unnecessary, Comment, supra note 12, at 1060 n.23. But see Note, The Theory oflProtectiejurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 1007 (1982); Note, supra note 12, at 480 (legislative history provides
insight into how statutory language should be constructed).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) (emphasis added). While allowing alien-foreign sovereign
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The unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, found that both the statutory language and the legislative
history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act clearly authorized federal jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign claims. 22 Although the
Supreme Court's characterization of congressional intent as unambigufedous has been criticized, 23 its general view of the Act as authorizing
24
eral jurisdiction followed the majority view on the subject.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's authorization of original
federal jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits did not guarantee
that federal courts could hear Verhhden, however. Federal jurisdiction
25
The
must be premised upon both statutory and constitutional bases.
third question, dealing with the constitutionality of the Act's grant of
federal jurisdiction, was the most heated issue in the Verlinden decisions.
The district court in Verlinden first rejected article III's "diversity"
clause as a constitutional basis for jurisdiction because of its specific references to citizens as parties, 26 a determination subsequently followed by
suits marked a departure from past practice, Note, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass,
34 STAN. L. REv. 385, 389 (1982), § 1330 had specifically replaced a diversity jurisdiction statute which had limited federal court access to suits involving at least one United States citizen as
a party. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1058 n.l. But see Note, supra note 12, at 480 (§ 1330
was repealed merely because Congress believed it redundant after the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, not' because Congress wished to increase jurisdiction).
22 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1969 ("[W]hen considered as a whole, the legislative history
reveals an intent not to limit jurisdiction under the Act to actions brought by American citizens."). Id.
23 Recent Developments, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 201, 207 (1983).
24 See Note, supra note 19, at 1866 ("courts generally have accepted the literal interpretation [of the Act's language] that it creates federal jurisdiction in foreigner-foreign state suits").
The best argument in favor of a construction of the legislative history of the Act as favoring
federal jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign claims is based on a reading of the jurisdictional
section in conjunction with the statute's automatic removal section, 28 U.S.C. 1441(d) (1976).
As noted by the district court in Verlinden, Congress' intent in granting foreign sovereigns an
automatic right to remove a case to federal court could not be fulfilled if the federal courts were
not granted jurisdiction over these suits. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1292. See Comment, supra
note 18, at 1042-43 (Foreign sovereign defendants seeking to remove might find federal courts
had no jurisdiction, frustrating congressional intent behind the removal provision).
It has been argued, however, that the automatic removal right granted to foreign sovereigns was intended to apply only to suits brought against them by American citizens and residents. Note, supra note 12, at 479-80. This reasoning had been applied in Santos Miranda v.
Transportes Aeros Portugueses, No. 78 C 2143 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1978), cited in Recent Developments, 16 TEx. INT' L.J. 277, 282 (1981). Ostensibly this interpretation is consistent with the
idea that the removal provision was passed to allow foreign sovereigns to remove cases from
biased state courts and their jury trials, which are absent in federal courts. However, such a
construction is "not as reasonable as . . . the Verl'nden" interpretation, id. at 282, for it ignores
the equally reasonable purpose in enacting the removal provision of promoting uniformity and
ignores the plain language of the removal statute.
25 Verinden, 647 F.2d at 324-25 (citing Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234

(1922)).
26 Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1289. The diversity clause confers federal jurisdiction over
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The clause's distinction between "States" and "foreign States" prevents the
former from being stretched to include the latter. The plaintiff in Ver/inden conceded the fact

"[clontroversies...

that the diversity clause was inapplicable. Ver/viden, 488 F. Supp. at 1289 n.6.
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both appellate courts in Verlinden.27 The issue thus became whether the
federal jurisdictional grant under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
fell within the "arising under" clause of article 111.28 The district court
held that the issue of sovereign immunity which was raised in Verh'nden
constituted a federal question sufficient for the case to arise under a federal law as required by article 111.29

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the Act's
jurisdictional grant unconstitutional. Writing for a unanimous panel of
three, Judge Kaufman found that neither precedent nor the structure of
article III supported constitutional federal jurisdiction over alien-foreign
sovereign claims. 30 Finally, the court rejected bases of constitutionality
31
grounded outside of article III.

The Second Circuit first found that the precedent of article III
would not support federal jurisdiction. The court of appeals agreed with
the district court that foreign sovereign immunity was a federal question. 32 The appellate court disagreed, however, that all federal questions
are sufficient to constitutionally support federal jurisdiction. Because article III's "arising under" clause had rarely been interpreted since the
1875 adoption of the statutory "arising under" clause, 33 the court first
analogized the constitutional provision to its statutory counterpart,
utilizing the considerable precedent interpreting the latter. 34 The court
then found that jurisdiction would not be authorized under the statute,
as the federal question of sovereign immunity arose only as a defense to
state action in Verinden.35 Federal questions arising in defense were insufficient to support federal jurisdiction under the statute's "well-pleaded
complaint" rule, which allows federal subject matter jurisdiction only
27 Ver'hden, 103 S. Ct. at 1970; Verliden, 647 F.2d at 325.
28 The constitutional "arising under" clause provides, "The judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST., art III, § 2,
cl. 1.
29 Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1292-93.
30 See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
32 Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 326 (questions of sovereign immunity are wholly federal).
33 Id at 325. In most cases, federal jurisdiction is asserted as "arising under" another
federal law and § 1331 is used to support Congress' approval of federal jurisdiction: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470, codif4dat
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Because article III is by necessity at least as broad as § 1331 (otherwise
§ 1331 would be unconstitutional), any case arising under the statutory congressional grant of
jurisdiction automatically arose under the constitutional grant, and direct interpretation of the
latter was unnecessary.
34 Ver/inden, 647 F.2d at 325.
35 Id at 326 n.20 and accompanying text. The legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act is fairly clear in retaining sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense. Case
Digest, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 523, 527-28 n.21 and accompanying text. But see Note, The
ProtectiveJunsdictionofthe Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 542, 556 n.81 (sovereign immunity
can be viewed as "an essential element of plaintiffs claim because the federal statute assumes
that the claim would have been barred. . . had the law not eliminated the sovereign immunity
defense").
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when the federal question appears "on the face of a well-pleaded com'3 6
plaint and . . . not in anticipation of a defense."
The court of appeals then turned to article III itself, examining
whether the scope of the constitutional "arising under" clause went beyond its statutory counterpart.3 7 Examining the pre-1875 cases which
had interpreted article III itself, the Second Circuit determined that the
bulk of precedent precluded federal jurisdiction and that cases to the
38
contrary could be reconciled on other grounds.
Beyond precedent, the Second Circuit in Verhnden argued that the
structure of article III's "arising under" clause mandated a denial of federal jurisdiction in Verh'nden. The court reasoned that federal jurisdiction
can be premised upon a question which arises under a federal law, but
not under a federal law which is purely jurisdictional. If a federal question could arise from application of federal jurisdictional statutes, ever,
congressional grant of jurisdiction would constitutionally "arise under" a
federal statute by arising under itself, and the "constitutional diversity
grant would then be surplusage. ' '39 The court thus determined that
cases must arise under substantive federal law to support federal jurisdiction. 40 Because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act regulated only
"judicial practice" rather than "regulat[ing] conduct and creat[ing]
rights outside the courtroom," the Second Circuit found federal jurisdic41
tion lacking.
Finally, the Second Circuit examined the possibility of federal jurisdiction being constitutionally authorized by provisions other than article
III. The court recognized the possible validity of a "protective jurisdiction" theory authorizing federal jurisdiction over areas of important na42
tional concern even when the requirements of article III were not met.
The court did not feel, however, that the national interest in Verlnden
43
was vital enough to remove it from article III's restrictions.
36 Section 1331 grants federal jurisdiction when (1) a suit arises under the law that creates
the cause of action, (2) the plaintiff's complaint discloses a need to interpret a federal law, or (3)
federal common law preempts the state law that would otherwise govern the case. Because only
the second was at issue in Verlinden, the well-pleaded complaint rule was examined. For a cogent description of the development of the rule, see Note, supra note 12, at 468-69.
The well-pleaded complaint rule has frequently been critized. See Articles and Notes cited
in Comment, supra note 18, at 1058-59 nn.141-43 ("As recently as 1969, the American Law
Institute recommended that removal jurisdiction be allowed if a federal defense were interposed"). Others have argued that the rule should not be abandoned but rather revised and
liberally applied in cases with foreign parties. See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 20,
at $ 0.66[4].
37 Verhden, 647 F.2d at 327-28 ("The Supreme Court has implied, but has never held,
that § 1331 occupies less than all of the ground staked out by the parallel phrase in Article III").
38 See t ifra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
39 Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 329. See Note, supra note 7, at 896 (pointing out how federal
jurisdiction premised on a jurisdictional statute is circular reasoning).
40 Ver/inden, 647 F.2d at 329.
41 Id. at 327.
42 Id. at 328-29.
43 Id. at 329.
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With one notable exception, 4 4 the commentators consistently called
for the reversal of the Second Circuit's constitutional decision in Verh'nden . 45 Critics began by rejecting the Second Circuit's article III precedent argument. Noting that the Supreme Court had never limited its
interpretations of the article III "arising under" clause to its statutory
counterpart's precedent, 46 the commentators disagreed with the court of
appeals' application of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule 47 and its analysis of pre-1875 interpretations of the constitutional "arising under"
clause. 48 The critics also rejected the Second Circuit's article III structural argument. Although most agreed with the court of appeals' theory
that federal jurisdiction cannot be premised solely on a purely jurisdictional statute, 49 the writers rejected the court's determination that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, by regulating conduct within the
courtroom, was therefore purely jurisdictional, noting that some procedural issues are nonjurisdictional 50 and that the distinction between the
conclusory labels "structural" and "procedural" is illusory. 5 ' The commentators also found the Second Circuit's protective jurisdictional analysis inadequate. Critics noted that a federal question is also necessary for
United States Supreme Court review of state court decisions. 52 Thus, the
44 Note, supra note 12. See also Recent Cases, 13 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 105, 110 (1981)

(approving without discussion the merits of the Second Circuit's Verlinden discussion).
45 See, e.g., Note, Defaults & Remedies Under InternationalBank Loan Agreements with Foreign
Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 123-24 (Second

Circuit
decision in Verlinden seems wrong; Supreme Court will hopefully reverse).
46
See cases and articles cited in Comment, supra note 18, at 1042 n. 19 (Supreme Court has
"repeatedly" asserted that article III is broader than § 1331). See also materials cited in Note,
supra note 12 at 469 n.46.
47 See Comment, supra note 18, at 1055-56; Note, supra note 7, at 893. But see Case Digest,
supra note 35, at 528 n.22; Note, supra note 35, at 556 n.81 (well-pleaded complaint rule should
apply, although both commentators urge reversal of Second Circuit Verlinden decision on other
grounds).
48 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 18, at 1052-55; Note, supra note 19, at 1866-68; Note, supra
note 7, at 904-06.
49 For a good description of the theories in favor of and against a federal question being
able to arise under a purely jurisdictional statute, see Note, supra note 12, at 473-78. The two
major proponents of the minority view are Professor Mishkin, who would allow a purely jurisdictional statute to support federal jurisdiction when Congress had an "articulated, active policy" interest, and Professor Wechsler, who would allow any jurisdictional statute to support
jurisdiction. Id. The majority view, however, is that only nonjurisdictional federal questions
can support federal jurisdiction, see supra note 39 and accompanying text, although some have
described this restriction as the only constitutional limitation on "arising under" jurisdiction.
Note, supra note 7, at 896.
50 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 18, at 1060-61 (fact that sovereign immunities provisions
are binding on states proves Act is not purely jurisdictional); Note, supra note 21, at 391 (Act's
banishment of punitive damages proves it to be substantive); Recent Developments, supra note
23, at 213 n.60 (Second Circuit's failure to examine § 1330's express cross references to the
substantive immunity provisions of the Act was an "unfathomable oversight"). But see Note,
supra note 12, at 470-73 (Second Circuit was correct in finding § 1330 to be purely jurisdictional
notwithstanding Act's impact on state courts regarding immunity and punitive damages; however, the Act could become substantive if Congress incorporated state substantive law).
51 Comment, supra note 12, at 1063-64 (advocating functional approach).
52 "[T]he [Supreme] Court cannot review state judgments not presenting a federal question," Note, supra note 7, at 918.
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Second Circuit's Verlinden decision denying original jurisdiction to federal courts would mean that the United States jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity would be determined solely, and perhaps inconsistently,
by fifty-one jurisdictions independent of federal review. 53 Because federal supremacy over foreign policy was at issue, federal jurisdiction
should be "stretched" to protect it, even if the article III requirements
technically were not met.5 4 Finally, a number of critics argued that deciding the constitutionality of the federal jurisdictional question before
deciding the statutory question of United States jurisdiction (sovereign
immunity) was contrary to the presumption against unconstitutional
55
construction.
Following the majority of the critics, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Second Circuit's Verh'nden decision. The Court
found the lower court's reliance on the statutory "arising under" clause
and its "well-pleaded complaint" rule unwarranted 56 and disagreed with
the Second Circuit's interpretation of precedent. 5 7 While admitting the
validity of the Second Circuit's structural argument that a federal question cannot arise from the application of a federal jurisdictional statute, 58 the Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as "purely jurisdictional. '59 Finding
constitutional authorization under article III's "arising under" clause,
the Court found it unnecessary to decide the validity of the "protective
jurisdiction" theory, 60 disappointing those critics who had thought Ver/in33 See, e.g., id; Comment, supra note 12, at 1064. One commentator also noted that the
Second Circuit's Verhsden decision may have rendered thegeneral Supreme Court review statute
constitutionally suspect, as that statute grants the Supreme Court certiorari powers over federal
questions even when they arose as a defense. Comment, supra note 18, at 1057.
54 Note, supra note 20, at 1007; Comment, supra note 12, at 1065-66.
55 Case Digest, supra note 35, at 529; Recent Developments, supra note 23, at 210 n.47. See
also Note, supra note 12, at 465 n.22, 480-81 (using the presumption against unconstitutional
construction to argue for a restrictive reading of the statutory "arising under" clause).
One commentator has also noted that the Second Circuit's ruling on the constitutional
issue may have been unlawful when combined with the court's refusal to allow the United
States to intervene to defend the statute's constitutionality. Comment, supra note 18, at 1041
n.14. The Supreme Court did not mention this alleged violation in its opinion, although it did
allow the government to intervene. Note, supra note 45, at 256 n.26 (United States filed brief in
Supreme Court on Verlinden case).
56 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1972. The Court did not discuss the Second Circuit's classification of sovereign immunity as a defense but instead objected to the very use of § 1331 and its
well-pleaded complaint rule as analogous precedent.
57 See rinfa notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
58 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1972-73.
59 Id at 1973. The Court found that the "primary purpose" of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act was to establish comprehensive rules governing sovereign immunity. The fact
that section 1330(a) was labeled as jurisdictional did not deny its purpose of regulating foreign
sovereign immunities law.
60 Id. at 1970 n.17. Despite the Court's hesitancy to rule on the "protective jurisdiction"
issue, it noted that Congress had "exercised its article I powers," id at 1971 & n.19, in "enact[ing] a broad statutory framework governing assertions of foreign sovereign immunity," id. at
1973, an area in which the "primacy of national concerns is evident."
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6
den ideally suited to its establishment. '
The fourth issue in Vetrlinden, whether United States jurisdiction existed over Nigeria's Central Bank due to a lack of sovereign immunity, is
perhaps the most difficult to resolve and potentially the most far-reaching. 62 The district court found that Nigeria's Central Bank had neither
explicitly nor implicitly waived its sovereign immunity in America by
agreeing to arbitration in France 6 3 and that personal jurisdiction was
therefore lacking. 64 The court of appeals in Verhnden ruled its federal
jurisdiction unconstitutional and therefore did not address the immu-

nity/United States jurisdictional issue in Verhnden,65 although dicta in
related cases which it decided the same day may call the district court
decision into question. 66 The Supreme Court similarly ruled only on the

federal jurisdictional issue, remanding Verlinden to the Second Circuit to
67
review the United States jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity.

The Court first addressed the argument that permitting aliens to sue foreign sovereigns in American courts would cause them to be "turned into
small 'international courts of claims,' ",68 an eventuality Congress sought
to avoid. 69 The Court correctly noted that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act protected against a flood of foreign suits, not by limiting the

parties, but through substantive provisions requiring "substantial contact
with the United States."' 70 The Court also implied that forum non conveniens should be used when necessary to restrict foreign access to American courts, even when jurisdiction could legitimately be asserted over the
61 Note, supra note 20, at 1014 (suggesting that the protective jurisdiction theory be
adopted on the grounds listed in note 60). The Court's failure to adopt the theory is typical, id
at 937 (majority of Supreme Court has never expressly adopted the theory), although perhaps
not surprising, id. at 938 (Ver/inden may be an "awkward" case in which to establish the theory).
But see Comment, supra note 18, at 1065 (Ver/inden is ideally suited to establishment of protective
jurisdiction theory).
62 Recent Development, supra note 23, at 211-12. See also infa notes 116-43 and accompanying text.
63 Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1300-02. Nigeria had agreed to the arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, id. at 1300, raising the question of whether it
had implicitly waived its immunity in other jurisdictions as well. For a description of the types
of sovereign commercial activities which can lead to waiver of immunity, see Clarke, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 3 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 206, 218-19 (1978).

64 Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1302. The district court should have found that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction as well, for neither type of United States jurisdiction exists when the
sovereign defendant is immune. See Verfinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1967 n.5.
65 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1973-74 (describing court of appeals' restraint).
66 See Note, supra note 12, at 466 n.22 (three of four factors which persuaded Second Circuit that minimum contacts existed in related cases also exist in Ver/inden). See also Note, supra
note 45, at 115 n.124 and accompanying text ("direct effect" on United States exists in Ver/inden,
satisfying the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction); but see Case Digest, supra
note 35, at 533 ("direct effects" and minimum contacts lacking in Verlinden).
67 Ver/inden, 103 S. Ct. at 1974.

68 Id. at 1969.
69 Hearingson H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations

of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976) (statement of Bruno A. Ristan,
Chief, Foreign Litigations Section, Civil Division, Department of Justice), cited in Ver/inden, 103
S. Ct. at 1969-70.
70 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1970.
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foreign sovereign. 7' Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court's notes
in Verh'nden did not establish the well-defined standards which are needed
in this politically volatile area.
The current uncertainty is unfortunate, and perhaps even surprising, given the length of the debate and the seemingly unanimous call for
uniformity in the law governing claims against foreign sovereigns. The
dispute over federal jurisdiction over foreign parties dates back to the
earliest stages of American history. Early drafts of article III had in72
cluded references to "all cases in which foreigners may be interested."
Article III as eventually adopted, however, specifically required "citizens" as one of the parties in its diversity clause. 73 The "arising under"
clause thus became the only possible source of federal jurisdiction over
74
suits between foreigners.
Unfortunately, for purposes of precedent, foreign sovereigns long enjoyed absolute immunity in United States courts. 75 Thus, while the federal government was no doubt interested in the foreign policy
implications of suits against foreign sovereigns in American courts, no
federal statute was necessary to protect these sovereigns. Courts dismissed such suits on absolute immunity grounds, never examining
whether a federal statute could have constitutionally supported United
States or federal jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause in the ab76
sence of such immunity.
In 1952, however, the State Department announced its adoption of
the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, 77 which limits immunity to a sovereign's public acts. 78 For many years, the courts de7,Id.at 1970 n.15.
72 &e Ver/inden, 647 F.2d at 328 n.23.
73 See supra note 26.
74 See supra note 28.
75 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., cases cited tn/fa notes 83-87. Only those cases between non-sovereign aliens
examined federal jurisdictional powers, as others were dismissed on absolute immunity grounds.
The greater federal interest in regulating jurisdiction over suits against foreign sovereigns was
thus not addressed.
77 The announcement of the adoption of the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity was
made in what has come to be known as the "Tate Letter," Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting
Legal Advisor to the Department of State, to Phillip Perlman, Acting Attorney General, May
19, 1952, reprintedin 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 984 (1952). For a discussion of the Tate Letter

and the problems persisting after its general acceptance, see Clarke, supra note 63, at 211-14.
78 See Note, supra note 1,at 275. A foreign sovereign is thus not immune from the consequences of its private acts, the most important of which are its commercial activities, for which
it is liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). See Dellapenna, Suing Foregn Governments and
Their Corporations:Sovereign Immunity (pt. 2), 85 COLUM. L.J. 228, 230 (1980). While the question
of what distinguishes a commercial act is not always clear, id at 232-33, the distinction depends
on the "nature" of the act rather than its "purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1976).
Foreign sovereigns may also be sued when their immunity has been waived either explicitly
(by contact or treaty) or implicitly (by submitting to arbitration). Id § 1605(a)(1). Sovereign
immunity may also be invalid as a defense against claims for recovery of property taken in
violation of international law, id.§ 1605(a)(3); against noncommercial torts claims, id.
§ 1605(a)(5); against admiralty claims, id § 1605(b); and against certain counterclaims, id
§ 1607. See generally Clarke, supra note 63, at 215-23.
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ferred to State Department determinations as to which sovereign acts
were entitled to immunity. 79 A desire to base these determinations on
consistent legal grounds rather than diplomatic and political case-bycase considerations, however, caused Congress to codify the restrictive
theory in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.80 Contained in
the Act was a provision granting federal courts original jurisdiction over
all claims in which foreign sovereigns lack immunity.8 The provision is
part of a comprehensive scheme designed by Congress to enhance uni82
formity in the law governing sovereign immunity.
Because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act directy conferred jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns to the federal courts,8 3 it required
courts to examine the constitutional "arising under" clause distinctly
from the statutory clause which had been the source of the bulk of "arising under" interpretation. 84 Direct interpretation of the constitutional
clause was rare and old. Early decisions had rejected congressionally authorized federal jurisdiction over suits between aliens without even discussing the "arising under" clause.8 5 Perhaps most notable was Mossman
v. Htigginson, examining Section eleven of the Judicial Act of 1789, which
conferred federal jurisdiction in any case "where . . . an alien is a
party. '86 In Mossman, the United States Supreme Court rejected this
grant of federal jurisdiction as inconsistent with the diversity clause and
87
did not even examine the "arising under" possibilities.
The leading case directly interpreting the "arising under" clause of
article III was Osbom v. Bank of the United States.88 Osbom arose when the
newly-created federal bank sued in federal court to enjoin the collection
of Ohio's state tax against it. Federal jurisdiction had been authorized
under the congressional statute creating the bank to protect it from hos79

See

erhden, 103 S. Ct. at 1968.

80 Id. Placing the burden on courts to determine questions of sovereign immunity solely

on legal grounds ensured that individuals would not be "denied a remedy in order to further the
foreign policy goals of a particular administration." Clarke, supra note 63, at 232.
81 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1969.
82 For a description of related parts of the Immunities Act also designed to enhance uniformity, see Comment, supra note 12, at 1059 n. 13. See generally von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunites Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Weber, The Foretgn Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning andEfect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1976);
Note, Limits ofjuridiialControl - The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 429 (1977).
83 See supra note 33.
84 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
85 The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); Hodgson v.
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (4 Cranch) 303 (1809); Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46 (1807);
Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 12 (1800).
86 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 12, 14 (1800).
87 Id. The Supreme Court did not strike down the statute despite its declared unconstitutionality, however, as the case predated Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
88 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (dicta). The Osborn dicta was made holding in Bank of
the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 398 (1824). The first major
Supreme Court case to examine the "arising under" clause of article III was Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See Note, supra note 7, at 904-05.
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tile state courts.8 9 Despite the fact that federal immunity would have
arisen as a defense to the state claim, 9° the United States Supreme Court,
and Chief Justice Marshall, found the grant of original jurisdiction constitutional: "[I]t is a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title
or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the
constitution or laws of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
construction. "9 1
Osborn was criticized for the breadth of its dicta in allowing federal
jurisdiction. Critics argued that the language, taken to its extreme, could
condone the "assertion of original federal jurisdiction on the remote possibility of presentation of a federal question."' 92 Consequently, interpretation of the 1875 statutory "arising under" clause did not follow Osborn
by analogy, despite the statute's similarity to the constitutional language
interpreted by Osborn.93 The most notable deviation was the interpretation of the statute as requiring the federal question to be disclosed on the
face of what would be a well-pleaded complaint in order for federal jurisdiction to be justified. 94 Thus, the federal question which arose as a defense in Osborn and which was found to justify federal jurisdiction, would
be rejected as supporting federal jurisdiction today under the statutory
"arising under" clause and its "well-pleaded complaint" rule.
Some question remained, however, as to whether Osborn remained
good law on the constitutional "arising under" clause. 95 The problems in
practice of applivtng broad statutory federal jurisdiction noted by Osborn's
critics now seemed distinguishable from the theoretical benefits of reserving
broad federal jurisdictional powers in the constitution in the event they
96
would someday be needed.
Despite this possible distinction, the Second Circuit in Verlinden
found the earliest cases to be controlling in interpreting the constitutional "arising under" clause. The Second Circuit placed particular emphasis on Mossman, in which "the Supreme Court found that the judicial
power did not extend to a suit between two aliens, even where the statute
conferred it." 97 Despite the fact that Mossman and the other cases had
89 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 817.
90 -d at 824.
91 Id. at 822 (quoted in Verhhden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971).
92 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter's remarks mirror those of other critics dating back to Justice Jackson's dissent
in Osbon, in which Jackson feared the expansion of federal jurisdiction which would result from
jurisdiction over suits that might arise under United States law. Osbom, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at
889 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Comment, supra note 18, at 1052-53.
93 Compare the language contained in article III, supra note 28, with that in § 1331,supra
note 33.
94 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 906.
96 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the Drtrict Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 162
(1953) (broad interpretation of article III is necessary to protect future federal interests which
are currently unforseeable).
97 Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 328.
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not specifically discussed the "arising under" clause of article 111,98 the
Ver/inden court of appeals felt that the Supreme Court in those cases had,
by implication, "necessarily held" it inapplicable by negating the congressional grants of federal jurisdiction. 99
The Second Circuit attempted to limit the contrary dicta in Osborn
by noting its critics' ° and limiting the case to its facts. "The Supreme
Court, faced [in Osborn] with the death of the [B]ank [of the United
States] . . . on the one hand and with stretching jurisdictional concepts
on the other, saved the Bank." 10 1 Osborn's dicta thus should not apply to
Verlinden, in which the supremacy of the federal government was not a
0
serious issue. 1

2

The Supreme Court in Verlinden brushed aside Mossman and the
other cases relied upon by the Second Circuit, stating that those cases
applied article III's constitutional limits to statutes which did "nothing
more than grant jurisdiction."'' 0 3 The Court then found Osborn, which
permitted federal jurisdiction over a claim supported by any reasonable
construction of the constitution or non-jurisdictional federal laws,10 4 to
be controlling. Because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was more
than a mere jurisdictional statute, 10 5 and because at least one reasonable
construction of the Act gave rise to a federal question, 0 6 Verlinden was

found to "arise under" a federal law for purposes of the Osborn constitutional test.' 0 7 The Court thus reaffirmed its commitment to a broad interpretation of the constitutional "arising under" clause and retained the
98 Id
99 Id. Federal jurisdiction may still be lacking over suits between two aliens when neither
is a foreign sovereign. See Comment, supra note 18, at 1041 n.15, citing Edlow Int'l Co. v.
Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977) (Foreign Sovereign Immunites
Act does not authorize federal jurisdiction over alien-alien suits; constitutional question not
addressed).
100 Verfhhden, 647 F.2d at 329. See also supra note 92.
101 Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 329.
102 Id. at 329-30 (refusing to extend Osborn to cases in which the United States is not a
party).
103 Id. at 1973. Because the statutes were purely jurisdictional, they could not constitute
federal questions sufficient to meet the requirements of the "arising under" clause. See supra
note 39 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's conclusion that any federal concern over
aliens in Mossman was limited to jurisdictional matters seems supported by the Mossman Court's
statement that "[n]either the constitution, nor the act of congress, regard, on this point, the
subject of the suit, but thepartiis." Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 14 (emphasis added). Sovereign
immunity was not at issue in Mossman because the immunity issue was considered settled at that
time (sovereigns were absolutely immune).
14 Osbom, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822.
105 The Court found that the primary purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
was to establish comprehensive rules governing sovereign immunity. Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at
1973. The fact that § 1330(a) was labeled as jurisdictional did not deny its purpose of regulating foreign sovereign immunties law. Id. See Note, supra note 7, at 911.
106 The Court ruled that questions arising under any non-jurisdictional statute - even
statutes regulating areas within the courtroom such as the immunity of the parties - were
substantive enough to constitute federal issues for article III purposes.
107 The Supreme Court in Verlinden recognized that the breadth of Osborn's conclusion had
been questioned. See supra note 92. But because the Court felt that the issue of sovereign immunity raised more than a "remote possibility" of a federal question in Verlinden, the Court avoided
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federal original and appellate jurisdiction necessary for a consistent application of the law governing foreign sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court's Verhden decision allowed the alien plaintiff
Verlinden to sue Nigeria's instrumentality in United States federal courts
for its acts which were not subject to sovereign immunity - despite the
fact that alternate forums existed in United States state courts and in
international tribunals. While allowing national forum shopping appears to support the congressional purposes behind enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the prospect of international forum
shopping is more troublesome.
In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Congress specifically intended to encourage federal jurisdiction in order to promote clarity in
the law governing foreign sovereigns.' 0 The Supreme Court's decision
in Verhnden not only permits federal jurisdiction in theory, but also virtually assures exclusive federal jurisdiction in practice.
The Court expressly stated that it "need not consider [whether] petitioner's claim that [the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] . . . renders
every claim against a foreign sovereign a federal cause of action."'O 9
However, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a federal question would not arise, and the Court itself went on to state that "every
action against a foreign sovereign necessarily involves application of a
body of substantive federal law."" 0
The logical progression from thispossible federal jurisdiction in every
case to exclusive jurisdiction by federal courts is a short one. The consistent body of immunity law which will be developed in federal courts will
necessarily support either the plaintiffs position, prompting the claim to
be filed in federal court under the original jurisdiction provision, or the
defendant's position, prompting the claim's removal under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act's automatic removal provision."' Even
before a uniform standard of immunity develops, it seems likely that one
of the parties will wish to take advantage of the federal courts' greater
familiarity with, and sensitivity to, the sovereign immunities law.,1 2 In
delineating the jurisdictional boundaries of article III under the Osborn test. Verlinden, 103 S. Ct.
at 1971.
108 See id. at 1973. Because alien-foreign sovereign actions were previously allowed in J.
Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 866 (1975), the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act allowed alien plaintiffs to bring suits
against foreign sovereigns in either state or federal courts. It is unclear why Congress did not
preclude state jurisdiction over foreign sovereign issues if indeed Congress' chief goal was consistency. Note, supra note 21, at 388 n. 19. It has been suggested that state jurisdiction has been
implicitly prohibited by the Act because state jurisdiction now "intrude[s]" upon a federal area.
See Comment, supra note 12, at 1070-71. In examining the practical effects of the Act, however,
state jurisdiction will be assumed arguendo to be valid and state-federal forum shopping to be
available.
109 Verhden, 103 S. Ct. at 1972 n.22.

110 M. at 1973.
111 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976). See supra note 24.
112 Comment, supra note 12, at 1059.
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addition, the Act provides significant statutory incentives to encourage
suits against foreign sovereigns to be decided in federal courts by specifi13
cally eliminating the minimum amount in controversy requirement
1 4
and the plaintiffs right to a jury trial.
While the Supreme Court
noted in Verinden that "Congress did not prohibit [state alien-foreign
sovereign] actions when it enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
. *.,)"115 the incentives inherent in the availability of federal jurisdiction
should prompt the parties to restrict themselves in practice to federal
courts, contributing further to uniformity in immunities law.
More worrisome implications of permitting alien plaintiffs to sue in
United States courts are caused by the prospect of international forum
shopping. The clarity of the language of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act gave the Verlinden court little choice but to find that Congress6
had authorized federal jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits. 1
The potential policy ramifications of extraterritorial assertions of American jurisdiction, however, deserve review from both Congress and future
courts presiding over alien-foreign sovereign disputes.
Critics of United States assertions of jurisdiction over alien-foreign
sovereign suits essentially make two arguments. The first is that American courts will be flooded with suits by aliens seeking a jurisdiction more
receptive to their claims. The motive to file in American courts would
seem to be clear, with foreign commentators noting that, "As a moth is
drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States."" 7 It has
been argued, however, that the Supreme Court's decision to open the
federal courts to alien-foreign sovereign suits will not significantly increase the number of cases over the number filed before Verhnden, when
aliens simply asserted their claims against foreign sovereigns in American
state courts.' 8 Furthermore, the requirement that the defendant foreign
sovereign have minimum contacts in the United States, and the possibility of immunity, provide additional checks against frivolous alien claims
''3

28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).

114 Id. Eliminating the right to a jury trial is one of the most important incentives to removal to federal courts. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIcE, supra note 20,

0.66[4] nn.12-14 and

accompanying text. The provision eliminating jury trials has been upheld as constitutional, see
Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), although the Act has been
interpreted as not extending its prohibition on jury trials to diversity cases. Comment, supra
note 18, at 1049-50 n.73.
It has also been suggested that the due process requirements are easier to meet in federal
courts than in state courts, as jurisdiction can be satisfied by minimum contacts anywhere in the
United States rather than merely in the forum state. Note,Jurisdkctton Over Domestic and Alien
Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 122 (1983).
115 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1970 n.16.
116 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
117 Grossfield & Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to JurisdictionalConfcts in InternationalEco-

nomic Law, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 931, 932 (1983). Factors listed as encouraging litigation in
the United States are America's contingency fee system, its general view that losing plaintiffs do
not pay defendants' costs, and the propensity to award higher damages than foreign courts.
118 See Recent Development, supra note 24, at 286-87.
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crowding American courts. 119 The significance of Verhden as the first
Supreme Court case to officially condone American jurisdiction over
alien-foreign sovereign suits should not be overlooked, however. It is reasonable to believe that aliens, conclusively told by Ver/inden that their
suits against foreign sovereigns will not be rejected automatically by
United States courts, will likely bring more suits in America, although
admittedly the extent of the increase in volume is somewhat uncer20
tain. 1
A second negative implication of permitting alien plaintiffs to
choose to sue in United States courts is the negative effect American assertions of jurisdiction will have on foreign sovereigns, which will no
doubt view in political terms what Congress believed were the objective,
legally-based decisions of American courts. t 2 1 Negative reactions can be
expected, as United States assertion of jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits "would deviate from current international practice"' 22 and
would probably include suits not justiciable in the sovereigns' own
courts. 123 Foreign sovereigns may well retaliate by trading in the future
through banks not subject to United States jurisdiction, 124 by imposing
unreasonable jurisdiction over American companies with less than minimum contacts in their country, or by enacting blocking statutes.12 5 Such
reactions by foreign sovereigns would be contrary to the congressional
goal in enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of bringing about
12 6
greater harmony between the United States and foreign sovereigns.
The concern over other countries' reactions to American assertions
of jurisdiction is a legitimate one, but negative reactions also arise from
the article III diversity clause's authorization of American jurisdiction
over suits against foreign sovereigns by United States citizens. The difference between diversity cases and alien-foreign sovereign cases, however, is that in the former, the American interest in protecting its own
citizens is believed to outweigh the possible negative consequences of extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction.127 American interest in providing
a forum in the latter situation is less clear-cut, and one commentator has
119Note, supra note 19, at 1865. Although the due process protections are probably not
constitutionaly conferred on aliens, Note, supra note 12, at 481, minimum contacts are mandated
by the Act. Id
120 Even small increases in the number of suits may have a significant impact, as most of
these cases are quite complex and involve large amounts of money. Note, supra note 19, at 1861
n.6.
121 Grossfield & Rogers, supra note 117, at 932 (foreign countries understand the American
values involved but "resent the exportation ... of American enforcement through private attorneys general"). See also
Comment, supra note 18, at 1040 n. 10 (Nigeria initially refused to file
a brief with the Supreme Court in Verlinden); Note, supra note 19, at 1874 n.97 (listing examples
of foreign hostility to American extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction).
122 Note, supra note 12, at 483.
123 Note, supra note 19, at 1874.
124 Recent Development, supra note 24, at 289.
125 Note, supra note 12, at 485.

Recent Development, supra note 24, at 285 n.31.
127 Note, supra note 12, at 485-86.
126
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even suggested that Congress rewrite the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act to specifically exclude alien-foreign sovereign suits from American
1 2
federal or state jurisdiction.
This suggested approach appears unduly restrictive, however. The
proposal downplays the significant benefits possible through American
jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits. Applying United States
law extraterritorially could protect foreign subsidiaries of American companies 129 or other American investments in foreign corporations which
might lack a remedy elsewhere. 130 Exercising American jurisdiction in
such cases might also encourage creditors to utilize American banks or to
increase their volume of trade by dealing with different foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.' t3
It has also been suggested that
American courts could better "protect individuals against repressive" regimes whose policies conflict with our notions of basic fairness and
32
human rights. 1
Just as significant are the checks provided which should limit, to
some extent, the volume of alien suits in American courts. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act authorizes only suits against foreign sovereigns, not against all aliens, in American courts. ' 33 Some of those sovereigns will be entitled to immunity, and of those which are not, some will
lack the contacts necessary to cause the "direct effect" in the United
34
States necessary for personal jurisdiction.
Neither the immunity waiver nor the minimum contacts of a foreign
sovereign are terribly difficult to prove, however, thus providing little
protection against the fears of court flooding and foreign sovereign animosity. The crucial check, then, is provided in the modified forum non
128 Id. at 486. In addition to the policy arguments discussed infia notes 129-32 and accompanying text, eliminating United States "arising under" jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign
suits may be unworkable. The brief period following the Second Circuit's Verlinden declaration
that such jurisdiction was unconstitutional saw the development of several alternate theories of
jurisdiction intended to circumvent the decision's mandates. See Comment, supra note 18, at
1067-69 (development of "minimal" diversity theory and assignment of claims to American
citizens). These theories would be available to similarly circumvent a statutory ban.
129 Comment, supra note 18, at 1067.
130 Note, supra note 7, at 917-18. Such a situation occured in J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays
Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert. dnttd, 423 U.S. 866 (1975), in
which Uganda admitted severing its irrevocable letter of credit to an Israeli partnership established in a United States bank. Because Uganda broke diplomatically and cancelled all letters
of credit in favor of Israel, no cause of action remained in Uganda or Israel. Uganda's failure to
agree to subject itself to an international arbiter rendered alternative forums questionable. The
New York Court of Appeals thus accepted jurisdiction and granted plaintiff summary
judgment.
131 Clarke, supra note 63, at 232 (greater certainty of legal rights will encourage investment).
132 Note, supra note 19, at 1870-71. While extraterritorial application of controversial
United States policies may initially lead to resentment and retaliation by affected foreign sovereigns, at least one commentator has noted that "it could serve as a starting point for negotiation
on an international agreement" on the law of sovereign immunity. Clarke, supra note 63, at 233.
133 See supra note 99.
34
1 See supra note 119.
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conveniens theory adopted by the Supreme Court in Verlinden . 13 5
The modified theory suggests adding additional considerations in
alien foreign sovereign suits to the the traditional forum non conveniens
analysis. Courts applying the new rule should examine five areas in making their determinations: (1) Whether an alternative forum is available,' 36 (2) Whether the cost and convenience of litigating in American
courts is unduly burdensome on the parties, 37 (3) Whether United
States jurisdiction will strain American foreign relations with the defendant foreign state,138 (4) Whether American courts are sufficiently competent to apply the law which governs the case, 139 and (5) whether the
foreign courts are conducted in a sufficiently fair manner. 140 The
Supreme Court's acceptance of the modified forum non conveniens rule
opens the door for its aggressive application by American district courts,
and dismissal of Verhnden may well be appropriate on forum non conveniens grounds even if Nigeria's Central Bank lacks immunity.' 4 1 It is
to be hoped that the forum non conveniens theory will be further modified to allow for its aggressive application by appellate courts as well, in
order to promote uniformity and to limit the number of unnecessary and
politically harmful suits between foreigners brought in American
42
courts. 1
Although clarification by Congress of its intent regarding American
135 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1970 n.15.
136 Note, supra note 19, at 1875. Generally dismissals would not be granted unless jurisdiction in another forum was available or the parties consented to such jurisdiction, see supra note
130, although exceptions would be made where the negative foreign policy implications of
American adjudication outweighed unfairness to the plaintiff of dismissal. Note, supra note 19,
at 1875.
137 Id This portion of the analysis is part of traditional forum non conveniens evaluation.
138 Id at 1876. Court examination of negative foreign policy repercussions at first blush
appears contrary to the the congressional desire in enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act to base immunity questions on legal rather than political considerations. See supra note 80
and accompanying text. However, the congressional desire was designed primarily to limit the
inequitable effects which administrations' case-by-case determinations caused on different parties. Court examination of the political repercussions of granting or denying sovereign immunity is not only consistent with legal analysis, but necessary to informed decisionmaking. The
key difference after the Act is that courts, unlike the State Department, are disinterested with
respect to foreign policy and are more likely to objectively weigh individual rights against that
policy. The development of a consistent rule of application of forum non conveniens is not
inconsistent with the congressional goals behind the Act.
139 Note, supra note 19, at 1876-77. This section is part of the choice of law examination
used in traditional forum non conveniens analysis.
140 Id at 1877. The author of the modified theory notes that courts should "not presume"
unfairness by foreign courts,,implying that the mere possibility of a different outcome is insufficient grounds to deny dismissal based on forum non conveniens.
141 See Note, supra note 12, at 481-83 (alternate forum in Verhhden is available; dismissal is
justified).
142 The author of the modified forum non conveniens theory suggests that "[a]ppellate
courts should be deferential in reviewing applications of this rule by trial courts," just as they
are deferential under applications of traditional forum non conveniens. Note, supra note 19, at
1875 n.100. The importance of this doctrine as the preeminent check on undesirable alienforeign sovereign suits in American courts, however, would seem to demand freer review by
appellate courts.
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43
jurisdiction over alien-foreign sovereign suits may still be desirable,'
the modified forum non conveniens theory provides a workable balance
in the interim. In sum, international forum shopping may offer significant benefits if the possible negative foreign policy repercussions are considered and checked when necessary.
In Verinden B. V v. CentralBank of Nigeria, the United States Supreme
Court decided that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act constitutionally grants federal courts jurisdiction to decide the sovereign immunities
issue in suits between aliens and foreign sovereigns. The decision marks a
reaffirmation of the broad interpretations of the "arising under" clause of
article III. Verlinden also supports the congressional desire to encourage
sovereign immunity decisionmaking in federal courts, which eventually
should become the exclusive arbiters in United States court disputes between aliens and foreign sovereigns. Any potential negative foreign policy implications of American jurisdiction over these disputes should be
checked through an aggressive modified policy of forum non conveniens.
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Case Digest, supra note 35, at 533-34 (requesting congressional clarification).

